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City of Longmont Colorado v. Colorado Oil & Gas Association, 369
P.3d 573 (Colo. 2016).
Arie R. Mielkus
In Colorado, the oil and gas industry's use of hydraulic fracturing,
and municipalities’ attempts to restrict where the practice can be done, are
at odds. Those in favor of hydraulic fracturing laud the economic benefits
and natural gas’s ability to burn cleaner than coal, while those in
opposition warn of potential adverse environmental impacts including the
strain on water resources in the arid west. The City of Longmont was sued
following its enactment of an amendment outlawing hydraulic fracturing
within city limits. The City’s amendment was found to be preempted by
state law, and thus could not remain in force. While this case plays out in
Longmont, Colorado, hydraulic fracturing’s prevalence in the U.S. today
ensures the battle between the industry and local governments will remain
a common saga.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2012 the City of Longmont, Colorado passed Article XVI1
prohibiting hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”), and the storage and disposal
of fracking wastes within city limits.2 Colorado Oil and Gas Association
sued the City of Longmont to prevent the Article’s enforcement.3
Establishing that fracking regulation is a matter of mixed state and local
concern, the Colorado Supreme Court found an operational conflict
existed between the state’s interest and Article XVI.4 The Court held that
Article XVI conflicted with state law, and was therefore preempted by the
state’s interest in the “efficient and responsible development of oil and gas
resources."5 Finally, the Colorado Constitution’s inalienable rights
provision did not save Article XVI because it was inapplicable to
preemption analysis.6
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Article XVI was passed by the voters of Longmont amending its
home-rule charter. It reads:
It shall hereby be the policy of the City of Longmont that
it is prohibited to use hydraulic fracturing to extract oil,
gas, or other hydrocarbons within the City of Longmont.
1.
2.

Longmont, Colo., Code of Ordinances, Article XVI (2012).
City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 577 (Colo.

3.
4.
5.
6.

Id.
Id. at 581.
Id. at 585.
Id. (citing COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3).
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In addition, within the City of Longmont, it is prohibited
to store in open pits or dispose of solid or liquid wastes
created in connection with the hydraulic fracturing
process, including but not limited to flowback or
produced wastewater and brine.7
Not long after the Article’s passage Colorado Oil and Gas
Association (“Association”) sued seeking declaratory judgment and a
permanent injunction to enjoin the City of Longmont from enforcing
Article XVI.8 The Association is a nationally recognized trade association
promoting the extraction of oil and natural gas in the region.9 Several
interveners joined in support of both the plaintiff and defendant including
the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission joining as
plaintiffs.10
The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs.11
The court found an operational conflict between Article XVI and the Oil
and Gas Conservation Act that was “obvious and patent on its face.”12
The case was transferred from the Colorado Court of Appeals to
the Colorado Supreme Court pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-109
(2016).13 While the “virtues and vices” of fracking were hotly contested,
the Court confronted the narrow question of “whether the City of
Longmont’s bans on fracking and the storage and disposal of fracking
waste within its city limits are preempted by state law.”14 The Colorado
Supreme Court reviews grants of summary judgement by the district court
de novo.15
III. ANALYSIS
Tackling the question of preemption, the Court began by
clarifying prior cases that may have led to confusion.16 The Court
examined Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs.,17 and Voss v.
Lundvall Bros., Inc.,18 to explain the first step in the Court’s preemption
analysis: a determination of whether “the matter was one of statewide,
local, or mixed state and local concern.” This inquiry is distinct from the
analysis of whether state and local law conflict.19
7.
Id. at 577.
8.
Id. at 585.
9.
Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, ABOUT: MISSION & VALUE STATEMENT,
http://www.coga.org/about/ (last visited July 22, 2016).
10.
City of Longmont, 369 P.3d at 585.
11.
Id. at 577.
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Id. at 577-78.
15.
Id. at 578.
16.
Id.
17.
830 P.2d 1045, 1056-60 (Colo. 1992).
18.
830 P.2d 1061, 1064-69 (Colo. 1992).
19.
City of Longmont, 369 P.3d at 579.
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An understanding of home-rule cities and their regulatory power
is required to determine whether the matter is one of statewide, local, or
mixed statewide and local concern.20 Home-rule cities, such as the City of
Longmont, are sovereign entities with the power to pass municipal
ordinances.21 Consequently, matters of local concern supersede any state
law.22 In contrast matters of statewide and mixed statewide and local
concern “may coexist with state statutes as long as the ordinances do not
conflict with the state statutes.”23 Therefore, the analysis of whether a state
law and a local law conflict is only required when the law or regulation
invokes a matter of statewide or mixed statewide and local concern.
A. Statewide, local, or mixed state and local concern
A matter is determined to be either of statewide, local, or mixed
statewide and local concern by weighing the “relative interests of the state
and the municipality in regulating the particular issues in the case.”24 This
“totality of the circumstance” test includes a list of relevant factors:
(1) the need for statewide uniformity of regulation, (2) the
extraterritorial impact of the local regulation, (3) whether
the state or local governments have traditionally regulated
the matter, and (4) whether the Colorado Constitution
specifically commits the matter to either state or local
regulation.25
The Court found that the first factor weighed in favor of statewide
regulation to encourage the “state’s interest in the efficient and fair
development of oil and natural gas resources.”26 The Court was concerned
about creating a “patchwork of regulation” that would adversely impact
the oil and gas industry of Colorado;27 therefore, it classified the need for
uniformity of regulation as a statewide concern.28
The Court determined that the fracking ban would cause “serious
consequences” felt by those living outside of the City of Longmont.29 The
Court explained that the ban on fracking inside the city limits could
increase the cost of fracking outside the city limits.30 For this reason, the
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
22.
Id.
23.
Id. (quoting COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6).
24.
Id. at 580 (quoting Webb v. City of Black Hawk, 295 P.3d 480, 48586 (Colo. 2013)).
25.
Id. (quoting Ryals v. City of Englewood, 364 P.3d 900, 904-05 (Colo.
2016); Webb, 295 P.3d at 486).
26.
Id.
27.
Id. at 581.
28.
Id. at 580 (quoting Ryals, 364 P.35 at 904-05; Webb, 295 P.3d at 486).
29.
Id. at 581 (quoting City of Northglenn v Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 161
(Colo. 2003)).
30.
Id.
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Court determined the extraterritorial impact of Article XVI was a matter
of statewide concern.31
For the third factor, the Court found that the creation of the State
Oil Inspector in 1915 favored the regulation of fracking at a statewide
level. Simultaneously, the sovereignty of home-rule cities favored the
regulation of fracking at a local level.32 Thus, the third factor, addressing
the level of government that traditionally regulates fracking, was a matter
of mixed statewide and local concern.33
The fourth factor looks at whether the Colorado Constitution
assigns statewide or local authority to fracking. Like the third factor, the
Court found the matter to be one of mixed statewide and local concern
because the Colorado Constitution does not charge either the State or local
government with fracking regulation.34
This analysis revealed that the regulation of fracking within the
city limits of Longmont, and the disposal and storage of fracking waste
was a matter of mixed statewide and local concern.35 Following this
finding the Court began an analysis of whether Article XVI was in conflict
with state law.
B. Preemption
The Colorado Supreme Court began its analysis of whether Article
XVI conflicted with state law by an assessment of the “interplay between
the state and local regulatory schemes.”36 This analysis involved a “facial
evaluation of the respective regulatory schemes.”37
The Colorado Supreme Court recognizes three types of
preemption: express, implied, and operational conflict preemption.38
Express preemption is a clear and explicit statement by the legislature to
restrict a local government’s authority.39 Implied preemption is the
legislature implying an intent to “occupy a given field by reason of
dominant state interest.”40 Whereas an operational conflict preemption
arises when the operational effect of a local ordinance impedes the
application of state law.41 An operational conflict is analyzed to see if the
“effectuation of a local interest would materially impede or destroy a state
interest.”42
The Court did not find that express preemption was invoked by
Article XVI, nor did it agree with the Association’s assertion that implied
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id. (discussing Voss, 830 P.2d at 1068).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 579.
Id.
Id. at 582.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 583.
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preemption was invoked.43 However, the Court was persuaded by the
Association’s argument that an operational preemption conflict existed
because the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission’s “pervasive
oil and gas rules and regulations . . . includes a strong interest in the
uniform regulation of fracking.”44 These interests include the “efficient
and responsible development of fracking resources.”45 Thus, Article
XVI’s prohibition of fracking and the storage and disposal of fracking
waste was operationally preempted by the laws established by the
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission.46 Therefore, Article
XVI “materially impeded the effectuation of the state’s interest.”47
C. The inalienable rights provision
On behalf of the City of Longmont, citizen interveners contended
that the inalienable rights provision of the Colorado Constitution prevents
preemption by any state law that threatens those inalienable rights.48 The
citizen intervenors claim that the ban on fracking was to protect citizens’
inalienable rights, and therefore could not be preempted by any state law.
Article II, § 3 of the Colorado Constitution provides:
“All persons have certain natural, essential and
inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the
right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties;
of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and
seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.”49
The Court did not agree.50
The Colorado Supreme Court noted that if it were to hold that the
inalienable rights provision as “supreme over any state statute”51 any local
ordinance that invoked an inalienable right would always supersede state
law.52 The Court found that this would render the “home-rule provision of
our constitution unnecessary,” and it could not “countenance such a
result.”53
The Court discussed a holding from the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court that a state law prohibiting local regulation of oil and gas was in
violation of a “relatively rare” Environmental Rights Amendment

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 585.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 585 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 586.
Id.
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contained in the Pennsylvania Constitution.54 The Environmental Rights
Amendment of the Pennsylvania Constitution states that its citizens “have
a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural,
scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.”55 The Court
explained that Colorado has no similar provision, and the inalienable rights
provision does not adopt the “public trust doctrine” whereas, the
Pennsylvania Environmental Rights Amendment did.56 Therefore, unlike
the Pennsylvania Constitution that guarantees certain environmental rights
to its citizens, the Colorado constitution does not.57 Thus, “the inalienable
rights provision of the Colorado Constitution does not save Article XVI.”58
IV. CONCLUSION
The Colorado Supreme Court’s finding that Article XVI’s
prohibition of fracking, and the storage and disposal of fracking waste in
the City of Longmont was preempted by state law demonstrates its
regulatory preference of oil and natural gas at the state level.59 While the
Court refused to weigh in on the merits of fracking, it ended with a
discussion of the Environmental Rights Amendment in Pennsylvania.60
This may suggest that those looking to regulate fracking at the city level
in Colorado may be more successful by advocating for an adoption of a
similar amendment to the Colorado Constitution.

54.
(Pa. 2013)).
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. (discussing Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 985
Id. at 586 (quoting PA. CONST. art. I, § 27).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 586.

